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JIMINEZ v. MARY WASHINGTON COLLEGE
57 E3d 369 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In August 1989, Mary Washington College (MWC)
hired Anthony E. Jiminez, a black English-speaking na-
tive of Trinidad, as an assistant professor of economics.'
He would be eligible for tenure after six years of satis-
factory performance.2 In May 1993, MWC notified
Jiminez that because his performance had been unsatis-
factory, he would not be granted tenure, and would be
terminated in one year unless he met certain conditions.3
MWC attributedits action to Jiminez's consistently poor
student evaluations, failure to earn his Ph.D., and fail-
ure to produce scholarly work.4 Jiminez did not reapply,
but instead filed a Title VII action against MWC.s
MWC tracks its teachers' performance in three ar-
eas: "(1) teaching effectiveness (mostly based on student
evaluations); (2) service to MWC; and (3) scholarship
or professional activity."6 The annual reports on Jiminez's
covering 1989-1991 generally indicated his "skills as a
professor were lacking."7 The reports were based on poor
student evaluations and his failure to earn his Ph.D.8 In
February 1992, the other professors in the Economics
Department unanimously recommended that Jiminez
be given a termination contract. I
Jiminez's student evaluations "substantially im-
proved" in his last three semesters.' 0 Some students wrote
letters on behalf of Jiminez to Philip Hall, Vice Presi-
dent of MWC. The letters indicated that "Jiminez was a
caring man and a good professor."" Some letters sug-
I Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 372
(4th Ci. 1995).21d. at 373-75 In 1989 MWC offered Jiminez his position
on condition he earn his Ph.D. Id. at 372. Jiminez failed to
earn his Ph.D. by May of 1993. Id. at 383.
3 Id. at 375-76. Jiminez's terminal contract allowed him
to reapply on condition of "(1) substantial improvement in
student evaluations; (2) favorable evaluations by colleagues in
the Economics Department... ; (3) defense of his doctorate
dissertation; and (4) presentation of a paper at an economics
conference." Id.
4 Id. at 379.
5 d. at 376.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or das-
sify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
gested that a group of students "collaborated" to give
Jiminez poor evaluations in his early semesters.'2 One
letter stated that a student evaluation requesting MWC
"hire a professor who speaks English," was "discrimina-
tion in its truest form."
13
The district court, in a bench trial, ruled in favor of
Jiminez and awarded compensatory damages of
$15,000.4 The district court found that Jiminez had
established a prima fade case of race and national origin
discrimination. MWC rebutted Jiminez'sprimafacie case,
but Jiminez then demonstrated that MWC's stated rea-
sons for terminating him were "pretextual and unwor-
thy of credence" to the court's satisfaction.' s The dis-
trict court concluded that because Jiminez proved
MWC's explanation was a pretext, he had carried his
burden of proving that he was the victim of invidious
discrimination.
16
The district court rejected MWC's rebuttal for sev-
eral reasons. The district court found that letters written
by students on Jiminez's behalf suggested that he "was
the victim of concerted effort of racial discrimination
by some MWC students to have him terminated via poor
teacher evaluations." 7 Specifically, the court found that
Jiminez's first five semesters of student evaluations were
"tainted by collusion and racial and national origin ani-
mus," and should have been ignored by MWC.18 The
district court also found that MWC knew the evalua-
tions were tainted, yet failed to take corrective mea-
sures.' 9 Based on this taint, the district court disregarded
6 d. at 373.
7 Id.
sId. at 375 Jiminez received poor evaluations from stu-
dents in his first two years, and this continued into his fifth
semester, the fall of 1991. "Jiminez's student evaluations were
the lowest of approximately forty tenure-track faculty mem-
bers" for four of the five semesters, and the other semester he
was thirty-seventh. Id.
9 Id. This recommendation was based on (1) his consis-
tently poor student evaluations, (2) his failure to earn his Ph.D.,
(3) his occasional failure to cover all the material, (4) his lack
of faculty support, and (5) a self-conducted survey of the Eco-
nomics Department in which seventeen of twenty negative
comments related to Jiminez. Id.
10 d. at 375.
"Id. at 373.
'2 d. at 373-74.
1Id. at 374.
1
4Id. at 372, 376.
'Id. at 372.
6 Id. at 376.
17 Id. at 373.
"8Id. at 376.
9 Id. at 382.
the student evaluations from Jiminez's first five semes-
ters. It concluded that the more favorable evaluations
proved the earlier student evaluations were tainted, and
that only the evaluations from the last three semesters
were accurate. 20
The district court also pointed to another professor
in the Economics Department, Steve Greenlaw, who did
not earn his Ph.D. until his fourth year at MWC but had
been given tenure.2' The district court concluded, based
on Greenlaw's tenure, that MWC's reliance on Jiminez's
failure to obtain his Ph.D. was mere pretext.22 The dis-
trict court found that because Jiminez had established a
prima facie case of race and national origin discrimina-
tion and that MWC's proffered reasons for his termina-
tion were a pretext, then Jiminez was entitled to judg-
ment in his favor.23
MWC appealed, contending that Jiminez was not
the victim of invidious discrimination, but was in fact
terminated because he was an incompetent professor.24
Jiminez cross-appealed, claiming his damages were in-
adequate.2s
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court. The court of appeals found the district
court's factual findings were dearly erroneous and that
Jiminez had failed to prove he was the victim of invidi-
ous discrimination. 26 Moreover, it said the district court
misapplied the test from St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks.? The Fourth Circuit pointed out that under St.
Mary's, even if the plaintiff establishes a primafacie case
and the defendant's proffered reason for the adverse
action is found to be pretextual, the plaintiff still has
the burden of proving that the reason for the action was
discriminatory. 28 The court decided that Jiminez had
not proven that MWC discriminated against him. 9
20Id. at 379-80.
21 Id. at 376.
2Id. at 383.
23d. at 372.
24 d. at 376.
2 Id.
26Id. at 384
27 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (holding that trier of fact's re-
jection of employer's asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its challenged actions does not entitle employee to
judgement as matter of law under McDonnel Douglas scheme
applicable to discriminatory treatment cases).
28Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 378.
29d.
301d. (citingAnderson v. Bessemer City, NC, 470 U.S. 564
(1985) and FED.R.Ctv.P 52(a)).
311d. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)).
32Id. at 379.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
The Fourth Circuit cited several cases establishing a
deferential standard of reviewing findings of fact below.
The district court's findings of fact must be "clearly er-
roneous" to be disregarded. 30The appellate court should
not "exercise plenary review" or "substitute [its] version
of the facts."3' The court concluded that the findings
below should be "conclusive" unless "plainly wrong."3
However, the court pointed out that not all district
court findings are "sacrosanct.' 3 The court of appeals
will reverse a factual finding as being dearly erroneous
if the court "is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."34 The Fourth Cir-
cuit then pointed out the district court's findings of fact
may be rejected if:
(1) the district court labored under an improper view
or misconception of the appropriate legal standard;
(2) the district court's factual determinations are not
supported by substantial evidence; (3) the district
court disregarded substantial evidence that would
militate a conclusion contrary to what is reached;
and (4) the district court's conclusion is contrary to
the clear weight of the evidence considered in light
of the entire record. 5
The court of appeals added that this list was not com-
plete; for example the appellant could overturn the find-
ings by "demonstrating pitfalls in the avenue by which
the district court arrived at its factual findings."
36
The court cited several recent Fourth Circuit deci-
sions which overturned the district court's findings of
fact in Title VII cases.37 Under the Fourth Circuit's read-
ing of the facts, Jiminez was a poor teacher and was fired
33 d. (citing Wileman v. Frank, 979 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that factual findings by district court in Title VII
suit were dearly erroneous and accordingly reversed)).
3 Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
35Id. (citing Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720 F.2d 356 (4th
Cir. 1983)).
3Id.
371d. (citing Wileman v. Frank, 979 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that factual findings by district court in Title VII
suit were dearly erroneous and accordingly reversed); Lilly v.
Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 842 F.2d 1496 (4th Cir.1988)
(same); Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.
1983)(same), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083, 105 S.Ct. 1841, 85
L.Ed.2d 141 (1985). The cases cited by the court was not an
all-inclusive list. There have been other recent cases in which
the court found the findings of the district court to be errone-
ous and reversed or remanded a finding for the plaintiff in the
district court. See eg. Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100
due to his poor performance, not because of his race.
The court of appeals pointed out that MWC offered
Jiminez a job despite a divided recommendation from
the Economics Department, "inauspicious evaluations"
from the University of New Mexico (UNM), the fact
that he only met MWC's minimal standards, and "even
though he was not the most qualified applicant."38 Ad-
ditionally, Jiminez had not yet earned his Ph.D., although
on his application he indicated that he would receive
his doctorate degree in economics in June 1989 from
UNM? 9 MWC offered Jiminez a job, in part "to increase
the number of blacks on its faculty."
40
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
district court's determination that the student evalua-
tions for Jiminez's first five semesters should be disre-
garded.41 The court of appeals decided that the district
court erred in finding that the early student evaluations
were tainted by a racial conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit
pointed to the testimony and letters of students sup-
porting the conspiracy as "nothing but rank speculation"
and "far too insubstantial" to be the basis for disregard-
ing the early evaluations.
42
For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
pointed out that the district court, in finding the evalu-
ations tainted, had relied on a letter from one student
that referred to another student's statement that"[MWC
should] hire a professor who speaks English." The
student's letter called the statement "the truest form of
discrimination." The court of appeals characterized this
as an absurd bald assertion; "requiring that a professor
speak the native tongue in order to convey his ideas is
not any form of discrimination, invidious or otherwise
4 3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals admonished
the district court for failing to consider the evaluations
for Jiminez's first five semesters on an individual basis,
rather than making separate findings with respect to each
semester.44 The district court should have given credence
to the student evaluations because "student reaction is a
legitimate nondiscriminatory factor on which to evalu-
ate tenure candidates."45 The court of appeals pointed
(4th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Tobacco Worker's International Union,
577 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of error in the findings of fact in
eight Title VII cases. In two cases the district court found for
the Title VII defendant and the court of appeals affirmed. Pope
v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1982); Friend v.
Leidinger, 588 F2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978). In five cases the district
court had ruled in favor of the Title VII plaintif, but the court
of appeals found error and found for the defendant. Cases cited
supra this note. In only one case did the court of appeals af-
firm findings of fact from the district court in favor of the
plaintiff. Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).38Jiminez, 57 F3d at 372.
39 Id.
40Id.
4 1Id. at 3 79-80.
out that the student evaluations showed that "Jiminez
was an inferior instructor, disorganized, confused, expe-
rienced difficulty in explaining concepts and answering
questions."46 While the district court found that MWC
knew the student evaluations were tainted, the Fourth
Circuit decided that the testimony did not support such
a finding.47 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court made a mistake by disregarding the evalua-
tions.
48
Jiminez had claimed, and the district court agreed,
that his last three semesters' student evaluations im-
proved because "the students understood that no more
discriminatory collaboration would be tolerated."49 The
Fourth Circuit agreed with MWC that the improvement
was due to Jiminez's students' grades "dramatically" im-
proving.S0 Also, his class size dropped in 1992 and 1993
to an average of ten students, while the department av-
eraged twenty-six §tudents per class.5
The district court also erred, according to the Fourth
Circuit, in finding that the college used Jiminez's failure
to earn his Ph.D. as a pretext, based on the career of
another professor. The other professor, Steve Greenlaw,
had been hired in 1982; at that time a Ph.D. was not a
requirement for promotion, nor was it made a condi-
tion of his continued employment. S2 In 1989 when
Jiminez was hired, the faculty handbook stated that a
terminal degree (in most cases a Ph.D.) was required for
promotion to assistant professor. There was no such re-
quirement stated when Greenlaw was hired. 3
II. APPLICATION OF THE LAW
In St. Mary's, the Supreme Court affirmed that in a
Title VII case the plaintiff has the burden of establish-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie
case of discrimination s4 By establishing the prima fade
case, the plaintiff creates a "presumption" that produces
"a required conclusion in the absence of explanation."ss
This "presumption places upon the defendant the bur-






51d. (citing Brousard-Norcross v.Augustana CollegeAssoc.,









54 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746
(1993).
51Id. at 2747 (citing 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDEaCE § 67, at 536 (1977).
cie case-i.e., the burden of 'producing evidence' that
the adverse employment actions were taken 'for a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason."'5 6 Once the defendant
offers reasons for its actions that show that unlawful dis-
crimination was not the reason for the actions, and if
the evidence of those reasons is "believed by the trier of
fact," then the defendant has rebutted the presumption. 7
However, if the defendant is not believed by the trier of
fact, the plaintiff has not yet won. The important point,
according to the Court in St Mary's, is that the presump-
tion created by a prima fade case shifts the burden of
production to the defendant, but the "ultimate burden
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff"58 In other words, after the plain-
tiff has proven a primafacie case, and the trier of fact has
not accepted the defendant's proffered reason, the plain-
tiff must still prove discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit explained that in an appeal from
a case where the prima fade Title VII claim was estab-
lished, the issue is narrowed to whether there was dis-
crimination or not. 9 On appeal, the court should nar-
row its inquiry to the "specific proofs and rebuttals of
discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced."6°
Thus, the Fourth Circuit explains, the ultimate issue on
appeal is whether the plaintiff has proved that the "de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plain-
tiff.,,61
The Jiminez court next explained that under St.
Mary's the term "pretext" refers to "'pretext for discrimi-
nation,' not whether the defendant's articulated reason
for the challenged action is false."6 Thus the plaintiff
does not automatically prevail by showing that the
defendant's proffered explanation is not true.63 Ulti-
mately the plaintiff, under this rule, "must prove 'both
that the reason was false and that discrimination was
the real reason' for the challenged conduct.r4 To sum-
marize, the Fourth Circuit explained that after the plain-
tiff has made a prima facie case and the defendant has
offered a rebuttal:
the plaintiff is not automatically entitled to judge-
ment because the fact-finder may determine that the
-1 Id. (citing Texas Dept. of Communit Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).57 d.
Sld. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).The Burdine Court
also pointed out that this is the same standard as Rule 301 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise pro-
vided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a pre-
sumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the
risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
challenged conduct is pretextual, but does not con-
stitute invidious discrimination. Accordingly, rejec-
tion of the defendant's proffered reason-standing
alone--does not compel the ultimate conclusion
that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against
the plaintiff, thus creating liability under Title VII,
but rather this factor may enter the calculus for de-
termining this conclusion.
65
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court
applied the St. Mary's standard improperly. Even if
MWC's proffered reasons (poor teaching performance)
were pretextual, Jiminez still had to prove that MWC's
termination of Jiminez was due to invidious discrimina-
tion." The court of appeals found that, based on its re-
versal of the district court's findings of facts, "Jiminez
failed to satisfy his ultimate burden of proving he was
the victim of invidious discrimination."67
CONCLUSION
Jiminez confirms the fears of some commentators
that St. Mary's has made it much more difficult for plain-
tiffs to prevail in Title VII cases.68 Employers have noth-
ing to lose and everything to gain by offering reasons to
justify their actions, whether true or not. If believed,
the employer has won by rebutting the plaintiff's prima
fade case. If not believed, the employer still has a chance
of winning, because the burden once again shifts to the
employee to prove that the true reason for the chal-
lenged action was invidious discrimination. Only if the
employer offers no explanation, or impermissible ex-
planations, will the plaintiff win by making a prima facie
case. Effectively, this rule means that employers will al-
most always offer a permissible reason for their actions,
even if untrue. Once the employer has offered the rea-
son, the plaintiff has the burden of both showing that
the reason is pretextual and that the real reason is in-
vidious discrimination.
It is also worth noting that the Fourth Circuit ex-
hibited little restraint in Jiminez in overturning the find-
ings of fact from the district court. The court was quick
to read the transcript and interpret the testimony in light
59JiMinez, 57 F.3d at 377 (citing United States Postal Serv.
v.Aikins, 460 U.S. 711, 714-16 (1983)).601d. (citing St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2752).
61 Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253,256).
62Id. (citing St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2752).





68 See generally Kristin T. Saam, Rewarding Employeri' Lies:
Making Intentional Discrimination Under Tite VII Harder to
Prove, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 673 (1995).
very favorable to the defendant.6 Prior cases in the
Fourth Circuit indicate a trend to find for the defendant
in Title VII cases.7°
This case demonstrates the difficulty created by St.
Mary's, both for plaintiffs and also for courts attempt-
ing to apply Title VII. First, courts, such as the district
court here, mechanically apply the requirements of shift-
ing the burden of proof at each stage, but fail to remem-
ber that the ultimate issue is whether or not there was
discrimination. Second, when applied properly, the rule
in St. Mary's makes the plaintifFs job much more diffi-
cult. Under St. Mary's, the plaintiffmust establish aprima
69Jiminez, 57 .3d at 380 (describing letters and testimony
of students suggesting conspiracy as "rank speculation and ...
far too insubstantial to.. .[infer] collusive discrimination," find-
ing that criticism of professor's English was racist was absurd
facie case of discrimination, show the reason proffered
by the defendant to be untrue or a pretext, and still ul-
timately prove invidious discrimination. Even if the
Fourth Circuit had accepted the district court's factual
findings, it probably still would have remanded the case
to require Jiminez to meet his burden of proving invidi-
ous discrimination.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Eric Buchanan
"bald assertion,"and finding that testimony did not indicate
presence of alleged racial conspiracy).
70See supra note 37.

